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Does 'Morality' actually exist?

Among the ancient Greek philosophers, moral diversity was widely acknowledged, but the more common nonobjectivist reaction was moral skepticism, the view that there is no moral knowledge (the position of the Pyrrhonian skeptic Sextus Empiricus), rather than moral relativism, the view that moral truth or jutification is relative to a culture or society, most of us live under a 'folk' view of ethics and morality. 

Moral judgments nonetheless have moral authority or normative force, not absolutely or universally (as objectivists contend), but relative to some group of persons such as a society or culture. This point is typically made with respect to truth or justification (or both), and the following definition will be a useful reference point:
 The truth or falsity of moral judgments, or their justification, is not absolute or universal, but is relative to the traditions, convictions, or practices of a group of persons.

Take the issue of Polygamy, one can be an appraiser of this custom that we do or should make moral judgments on the basis of our own standards and that of the relevant standards of those persons we are judging and or you can be an agent steeped in the 
in the Religious cultural construction that polgyamy is approved by one's God.

Each society has its own conceptual framework and those  conceptual frameworks are incommensurable with one anotherOne argument, expressed in general form by Donald Davidson (1984), states that disagreement presupposes considerable agreement 
In a response to emotivism one can see as evidence that just as there are shared criteria of ‘rude’ such that not just anything could be considered rude,  there are shared criteria of moral concepts such that not just anything could be a moral virtue or obligation. For example, there are substantial constraints on what could be considered courage, the war hero/ or the conscientious pacifist, each takes courage. Hence, there are significant limits to the extent of moral disagreements.
On the one hand, if ‘courage’ is understood broadly, in terms of confronting a difficulty to achieve some perceived good, then it is likely that most everyone values courage. However, this leaves room for very different conceptions of courage. Both warriors and pacifists may value it, but they may regard very different kinds of actions as courageous
. On the other hand, if courage is defined narrowly, for example, as the virtue of a warrior who faces the threat of death in battle (as suggested by Aristotle) which is but one view.
Hence, a moral judgment may be true for the occupant of one world, but not for the occupant of another we are constituted by our culture Hence, there are no perspective-independent reasons, we cannot stand astride some rock and judge from outside, we are all inside language.

So moralities can only have local validity. On this view, the truth of such moral judgments is relative to the sentiments of the persons who make them. Moral sentimentalism is a crucial feature of this argument and few  philosophers would deny that moral rightness and wrongness depend on our sentiments.: polygamy, arranged marriages, suicide as a requirement of honor or widowhood, severe punishments for blasphemy or adultery, female circumcision or genital mutilation Wong (1984) has argued that at least two different approaches to morality may be found in the world: a virtue-centered morality that emphasizes the good of the community, and a rights-centered morality that stresses the value of individual freedom

x However, the most common objectivist response is to claim that some specific moral framework is rationally superior to all others. For example, it might be argued, following Kant, that pure practical reason implies a fundamental moral principle such as the Categorical Imperative (see Kant's moral philosophy), or it might be claimed, following Aristotle, that human nature is such that virtues such as courage, temperance, and justice are necessary for any plausible conception of a good life (see the sections on the human good and methodology in the entry on Aristotle's ethics, and the entry on virtue ethics). If such an argument were sound, it might provide a compelling response to the relativist contention that conflicts between moral frameworks cannot be rationally resolved.

 This means that suicide (sanurai hara kiri) is right for persons in a some societies It is said to be the best explanation of rationally irresolvable or faultless moral disagreements. However, once moral truth is regarded as relative, the disagreements seem to disappear.

Moreover, if all moral values are understood in this way, how do we explain the authority of the contention that people should follow a set of values because they agreed to do so? Must there be a prior agreement to do what we agree to do?

 a priori arguments thatcould not be true, and a posteriori arguments that are probably not true do we canpare these claimed truths to a Piet Mondrian or an  animated Jackson Pollock painting than to the unambiguous configuration suggested by the first image

Another contention is that moral disagreements may be explained by religious disagreements: It is only because specific religious assumptions are made (for instance, about the soul) that there are moral disagreements. Once again, the apparent moral disagreement is really a disagreement of a different kind—here, about the nature of the soul. T
Several kinds of agreement have been proposed. For example, the role-reversal test implied by the Golden Rule (“Do unto others as you would have them do unto you”) has been prominent beyond Western traditions: A version of it is also endorsed in The Analects of Confucius, some traditional Buddhist texts, and elsewhere (see 
vHans Küng (1996) and others have maintained that there is a common “global ethic” across the world's major religious traditions regarding respect for human life, distributive justice, truthfulness, and the moral equality of men and women. For example, people may be influenced by passion, prejudice, ideology, self-interest, and the like. In general, objectivists think, insofar as people set these influences aside, and are reasonable Hence, the impersonal perspective must be limited by the personal perspective
universal constraints are sufficiently open-ended that there is more than one way to respect them. Hence, there can be more than one true morality. 
something ma be true nor false in any absolute sense (just as we might say with respect to standards of beauty)
In this context, tolerance does not ordinarily mean indifference or absence of disapproval: It means having a policy of not interfering with the actions of persons that are based on moral judgments he calls accommodation. This involves a commitment to peaceful and non-coercive relationships with persons with whom we disagree. 

People who accept relativism are more likely to be tolerant. As was seen, there is some evidence that relativists are more tolerant than objectivists, 

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