You imagine you are going there, to the place where I am (my “here”).

Cognitive empathy at its fullest Is achieved when one individual can mentally adopt the other’s perspective by exchanging places with the other in imagination.

Described phenomenologically: (The study of the development of human consciousness)

I am here and I imagine going there and being at the place where you are right now. 

Conversely, you are here (the “there” where I imagine being) and you imagine you are going there, to the place where I am (my “here”). 

Through this imagined movement and spatial transposition, we are able to exchange our mental perspectives, our thoughts and feelings. Whether apes possess this kind of mental ability is unclear and a subject of debate

In human children, the ability to mentally transpose self and other seems tobe linked to the emergence, at around nine to twelve months of age, of a whole cluster of cognitive abilities known collectively as “joint attention.”
 “Joint attention” refers to the triadic structure of a child, adult, and an object or event to which they share attention, and includes the activities of gaze following (reliably following where adults are looking), joint engagement with shared objects or events, using adults as social reference points, and imitative learning (acting on objects as adults do).
At around the same time, infants also begin to point to things and hold them up for someone to see, gestures that serve to direct adult attention actively and intentionally. Michael Tomasello has argued that “infants begin to engage in joint attentional interactions when they begin to understand other persons as intentional agents like the self.
 He proposes a “simulation explanation” of this developmental cognitive milestone, according to which the infant uses her primal understanding of others as “like me” (the grounding process of empathy, in phenomenological terms), and her newly emerging understanding of her own intentional agency, as the basis on which to judge analogically and categorically that others are intentional agents “like me” as well.