Those who think differently are not quasi human deplorables because they are just not like 'us'

Rorty argues that  we should remain profoundly grateful to Plato and Kant, “not because they discovered truths but because they prophesied cosmopolitan utopias” (p.173); 

but if we put foundationalism behind us, we could “concentrate our energies on manipulating sentiments, on sentimental education” and that would be the best way to promote those cosmopolitan utopias:

“That sort of education gets people of different kinds sufficiently well acquainted with one another that they are less tempted to think of those different from themselves as only quasi-human. The goal of this sort of manipulation of sentiment is to expand the reference of the terms ‘our kind of people’ and ‘people like us’.” (p.176)

This would correspond to what the ethicist Annette Baier called “a progress of sentiments” – which progress is towards increasingly seeing the similarities between ourselves and others instead of the differences.

Finally, as an anti-foundationalist, Rorty doesn’t think of ‘bad people’ as being deprived of moral knowledge. Instead, he thinks that a well-functioning human rights culture results from two conditions, security and sympathy:

Wake up!  Democrats come out of your we are 'better than you' because of our  moral (whatever that is) superiority.