'Thinking' must give up its old dream of portraying the mind and the world from some absolute standpoint outside the limits of human experience.
Instead, it should content itself with the world as we know it – in other words the world of phenomena
Philosophy should reinvent itself as phenomenology, or the methodical study of experience.
In doing so, it would have nothing to lose but illusions: what could ‘the world’ ever mean, except that to which our experience is directed? And what were we and our experiences, except a certain readiness or receptiveness towards the world?
The world and the self were not separate entities that we could scrutinise from outside, and the old metaphysical see-saw with objectivity on one end and subjectivity on the other was a myth: they were as inseparable as the two sides of a sheet of paper.
We should stop fantasising about a philosophy that would propound eternal truths about a world beyond our knowledge, and start trying to work out what things can mean to us within the horizons of our ordinary finite experience. This would give us the only absolutes we need; in fact, the only absolutes there are