A theory of meaning is compositional in the sense that it shows how the meanings of complex expressions are systematically “composed” from the meanings of simpler expressions, the snow is
white and their modes of significant combination.
It also leaves obscure what role the copula “is” plays in sentences such as “Socrates is wise.” Does “is” refer to a third object that somehow “binds” Socrates to Wisdom? But how does this work? Or does “is” represent some relation? But what relation?
So there is an 'adequacy constraint' on a theory of meaning.
And if we accept that then we must stop assigning objects (for example, ideas, universals, or intentions) to linguistic expressions as their meanings. IAs has been pointed out by Davidson “the one thing meanings do not seem to do is oil the wheels of a theory of meaning.
If we accept the above we become
radical interpreters who does not know what a speaker’s sentences mean, and does she have direct access to the contents of his propositional attitudes, such as his/her beliefs or desires. Both of these factors bear on making sense of verbal behaviour.
A speaker’s holding a sentence true is thus (as Davidson put it) a “vector of two forces” (Davidson 1974a, p. 196), what meanings his words have and what he believes about the world.
The interpreter thus faces the problem of too many unknowns.
The interpreter endeavour to solve the problem of meaning by performing her/his own thought experiment: she projects herself into her subject’s shoes and assumes that he does or would believe what she, were she in his position, would believe.
This emphatic endeavour
solves the problem of her not knowing what the speaker believes since she knows what she would believe were she in his situation, and hence she knows what her subject does believe if he believes what she thinks he ought to believe.
The Principle of Correspondence is the methodological injunction that an interpreter affirm the if-clause.
white and their modes of significant combination.
It also leaves obscure what role the copula “is” plays in sentences such as “Socrates is wise.” Does “is” refer to a third object that somehow “binds” Socrates to Wisdom? But how does this work? Or does “is” represent some relation? But what relation?
So there is an 'adequacy constraint' on a theory of meaning.
And if we accept that then we must stop assigning objects (for example, ideas, universals, or intentions) to linguistic expressions as their meanings. IAs has been pointed out by Davidson “the one thing meanings do not seem to do is oil the wheels of a theory of meaning.
If we accept the above we become
radical interpreters who does not know what a speaker’s sentences mean, and does she have direct access to the contents of his propositional attitudes, such as his/her beliefs or desires. Both of these factors bear on making sense of verbal behaviour.
A speaker’s holding a sentence true is thus (as Davidson put it) a “vector of two forces” (Davidson 1974a, p. 196), what meanings his words have and what he believes about the world.
The interpreter thus faces the problem of too many unknowns.
The interpreter endeavour to solve the problem of meaning by performing her/his own thought experiment: she projects herself into her subject’s shoes and assumes that he does or would believe what she, were she in his position, would believe.
This emphatic endeavour
solves the problem of her not knowing what the speaker believes since she knows what she would believe were she in his situation, and hence she knows what her subject does believe if he believes what she thinks he ought to believe.
The Principle of Correspondence is the methodological injunction that an interpreter affirm the if-clause.
No comments:
Post a Comment