It
is remarkable that an essay by a State Department official in the conservative
quarterly the National Interest should provoke a storm of debate in
the US and be syndicated by papers throughout the world. The burden of Francis
Fukuyama’s argument is that we are witnessing the end of history. That end will
not be as it has so often been imagined – either apocalypse or utopia. History,
in the sense of fundamental ideological and political change, will cease with
the worldwide triumph of Western liberalism.
Liberalism as the as the hegemon of the liberal world order, is a notion ridiculed by its grave diggers (populism)
- i
For we increasingly live in a post liberal age, witness populist movments in Ausria, Hungary,
Brexit, Marie Le Pen, and of of major significance the rise and rise of Donald Trump. Even if he loses the Election which he no doubt will, the political landscape of the USA is change forever.
Well done Obama. Wasn't Liberalism supposed an ideal that has triumphed, and it is central to the self-identity of
America?
What
is wrong with Fukuyama is his staggering
complacency. History is over, because all problems can be settled by
fully-developed liberal institutions that give us all the freedom we are ever
likely to get. You can only deliver this kind of over arching judgement if you have Olympian detachment.
The
future of liberal democracy is likely to be
one of conflict and change, not complacent celebration.
Got to be careful here not to indulge in an excess of erudition, however, what
presumption can stay the dialectic and pronounce history at an end?
How can we
know that a given state of affairs represents the realisation of the most
complete freedom?
Only by the philosopher making himself greater than the
dialectic.
As
an infinite process, dialectic makes some sense, but it is then divorced from
any connection with concrete events. Once the dialectic has to be actualised in
actual historical events it reveals its fundamental arbitrariness.
How does one
move from the idea to its incarnation? The answer is, of course, that the
connection of the ideal and the actual is entirely at the mercy of the
dialectician’s prejudices.
History
can only continue if there is a possibility of alternatives to liberal regimes:
‘Have we in fact reached the end of history? Are there, in other words, any
fundamental “contradictions” in human life that cannot be resolved in the
context of modern liberalism, that would be resolvable by an alternative
political-economic structure?
But why should we assume that the continuation
of history depends on the existence of alternatives to liberalism and the
possibility that they can supplant it in some new stage of development? Are
there not ‘contradictions’ (in the sense of political issues) within liberalism capable of sustaining
history (in the sense of large-scale tasks and changes) into the foreseeable
future?
Are liberal institutions capable of no development? Are there no major
problems within liberal politics that are not capable of fuelling conflict and
controversy worthy of being called history?
. In fact, dialectic is most consistent when it is conceived as a potentiallyinfinite development toward higher and higher levels of self-consciousness and freedom.
. In fact, dialectic is most consistent when it is conceived as a potentiallyinfinite development toward higher and higher levels of self-consciousness and freedom.
If
history is the struggle for freedom, then its end has been well and truly
postponed.
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