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The judicious spectator and the origin of a 'moral' point of view

The idea of a moral point of view can be traced back to David Hume's account of the “judicious spectator.” Hume sought to explain how moral judgments of approval and disapproval are possible given that people normally are focused on achieving their particular interests.

He conjectured that in making moral judgments individuals abstract in imagination from their own particular interests and adopt an impartial point of view from which they assess the effects of others' actions on the interests of everyone. Since, according to Hume, we all can adopt this impartial perspective in imagination, it accounts for our agreement in moral judgments. (See Hume, 1739/1978, 581; Rawls, LHMP 84–93, LHPP 184–187.)

Kant's categorical imperative procedure, 
Adam Smith's “impartial spectator,” 
Rousseau's general will, 
and Sidgwick's “point of view of the universe” 
are all different versions of such a moral point of view.

An important feature of the moral point of view is that it is designed to represent something essential to the activity of moral reasoning. For example, Kant's categorical imperative is envisioned as a point of view any reasonable person can adopt in deliberating about what he/she ought morally to do (Rawls, CP 498ff)

When joined with the common assumption that the totality of moral reasons is final and override non-moral reasons, the moral point of view might be regarded as the most fundamental perspective that we can adopt in practical reasoning about what we ought to do

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