Most non-intentionalist self-deceivers are responsible for individual episodes of self-deception, or for the vices of cowardice and lack of self-control from which they spring, or both.
To be morally responsible in the sense of being an appropriate target for praise or blame requires, at least, that agents have control over the actions in question.
Mele (2001), for example, argues that many sources of bias are controllable and that self-deceivers can recognize and resist the influence of emotion and desire on their belief acquisition and retention, particularly in matters they deem to be important, morally or otherwise.
However one feels in the case of Schiff the mechanism in question is so complex that it seems unreasonable to expect the self-deceiver to guard against its operation.
Of course a similar argument could be posited against Republicans
To be morally responsible in the sense of being an appropriate target for praise or blame requires, at least, that agents have control over the actions in question.
Mele (2001), for example, argues that many sources of bias are controllable and that self-deceivers can recognize and resist the influence of emotion and desire on their belief acquisition and retention, particularly in matters they deem to be important, morally or otherwise.
However one feels in the case of Schiff the mechanism in question is so complex that it seems unreasonable to expect the self-deceiver to guard against its operation.
Of course a similar argument could be posited against Republicans
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