Thiere is a sharp distinction between relativism and moral pluralism.
The inability to embrace categorically one particular moral position over another is the defining characteristic of moral pluralism.
Whereas the inability to categorically condemn any particular moral view or action against another is the identifying characteristic of relativism.
The former rests on skeptically reasoned understandings of rationality’s limits;
the latter involves an unsustainable regard on rationality itself.
The moral pluralist, it is argued, is capable of making a critical moral stand, which the relativist cannot.
The work of Alasdair MacIntyre and Richard Rorty are examples of pluralistically minded writings which fail to escape relativism. Hence it is argued that an implicit anti-relativistic, morally pluralistic stance, might beidentified as moral agnosticism
The inability to embrace categorically one particular moral position over another is the defining characteristic of moral pluralism.
Whereas the inability to categorically condemn any particular moral view or action against another is the identifying characteristic of relativism.
The former rests on skeptically reasoned understandings of rationality’s limits;
the latter involves an unsustainable regard on rationality itself.
The moral pluralist, it is argued, is capable of making a critical moral stand, which the relativist cannot.
The work of Alasdair MacIntyre and Richard Rorty are examples of pluralistically minded writings which fail to escape relativism. Hence it is argued that an implicit anti-relativistic, morally pluralistic stance, might beidentified as moral agnosticism
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