On the one hand, the practice of science takes the practitioner out of a directly lived relationship with “things”. In order to interrogate beings science manipulates them.
Science proceeds mainly by means of experimentation; that is, by manipulations designed to interrogate beings and thereby to coax these beings to reveal, through their “transformations”, information that confirms, informs, or changes very specific (limited) models of that thing.
In its manipulative praxis, science typically fails to encounter the real world. It may encounter bits of the world, isolating fragments (subatomic particles, organs, elements, isolated fragments, species isolated from ecosystems in experimental systems, or laboratory microcosms, and so forth).
In order to accomplish its “admirable” task, it furthermore, regards things as objects – without value, by truncating its relations with the lived wholes to which they belong. Secondly, science is concerned with the ultimate use of the things; despite its lifeless remove from the real world it assumes that all objects have a use-value.
To add to this, extrapolating somewhat from Merleau-Ponty’s critique and adding to it a certain Heideggerian tone, one can argue that science proceeds with a certain lifeless brutality, forcing beings to declare themselves, its pull them out of their concealment, demanding that they reveal themselves as they are in their truncated nakedness, and that they answer questions regarding their usefulness.
Source: http://10thingswrongwithenvironmentalthought.blogspot.co.uk/2011/08/merleau-ponty-and-critique-of-science.html
Science proceeds mainly by means of experimentation; that is, by manipulations designed to interrogate beings and thereby to coax these beings to reveal, through their “transformations”, information that confirms, informs, or changes very specific (limited) models of that thing.
In its manipulative praxis, science typically fails to encounter the real world. It may encounter bits of the world, isolating fragments (subatomic particles, organs, elements, isolated fragments, species isolated from ecosystems in experimental systems, or laboratory microcosms, and so forth).
In order to accomplish its “admirable” task, it furthermore, regards things as objects – without value, by truncating its relations with the lived wholes to which they belong. Secondly, science is concerned with the ultimate use of the things; despite its lifeless remove from the real world it assumes that all objects have a use-value.
To add to this, extrapolating somewhat from Merleau-Ponty’s critique and adding to it a certain Heideggerian tone, one can argue that science proceeds with a certain lifeless brutality, forcing beings to declare themselves, its pull them out of their concealment, demanding that they reveal themselves as they are in their truncated nakedness, and that they answer questions regarding their usefulness.
Source: http://10thingswrongwithenvironmentalthought.blogspot.co.uk/2011/08/merleau-ponty-and-critique-of-science.html
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