mer, now emerging as a form of cognitive neuroscience, ng as a form of cognitive neuroscience, is for the first time able to identifyy, now emerging as a form of cognitive neuroscience, is for the first time able to identify

 Instead of seeing disease as the identification of symptoms, it was the linkage of symptoms to distinct pathologies, understood as departures from normal function, that came to define disease.

 Heinrichs (2001, 271), for example, insists that psychiatry needs to employ this basic medical outlook, and therefore needs a developed theory of how the mind/brain works that can be used to identify psychological abnormalities and explain how they arise. 

Andreasen (2001, 172–76) embraces the strong interpretation. She argues that psychiatry, now emerging as a form of cognitive neuroscience, is for the first time able to identify the specific pathophysiologies that underpin the symptoms of mental illness