Nietzsche's moral philosophy is primarily critical in orientation: he attacks morality both for its commitment to untenable descriptive (metaphysical and empirical) claims about human agency, as well as for the deleterious impact of its distinctive norms and values
Because Nietzsche, however, is an anti-realist about value, he takes neither his positive vision, nor those aspects of his critique that depend upon it, to have any special epistemic status
Because Nietzsche, however, is an anti-realist about value, he takes neither his positive vision, nor those aspects of his critique that depend upon it, to have any special epistemic status
- Nietzsche believes that all normative systems which perform something like the role we associate with “morality” share certain structural characteristics, even as the meaning and value of these normative systems varies considerably over time. In particular, all normative systems have both descriptive and normative components, in the sense that: (a) they presuppose a particular descriptive account of human agency, in the sense that for the normative claims comprising the system to have intelligible application to human agents, particular metaphysical and empirical claims about agency must be true; and (b) the system's norms favor the interests of some people, often (though not necessarily) at the expense of others
- normative commitments.
- Human agents possess a will capable of free and autonomous choice (“Free Will Thesis
- Presuppose that “morality” has universal applicability
Do you believe that “morality” has universal applicability
I mean your moral claim,
can't be argued empirically so you hide out in the the metaphysical, in the clouds as it were
hiding behind a cloud,
Your 'immoral' accusation is made as if 'morality' was normative and static as opposed
to morality varying from time to time under whims and sentiment of human kind. Morality
is not a constant like the metaphysical clouds you hide out in its shape undergo constant
cultural change
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