Often one finds claims in popular discourse to the effect that alcoholics are not responsible for their drinking because the drinking is a symptom of a disease, or because it is the disease that causes them to drink.
There has been a great deal of discussion of whether alcoholism should count as a disease, by physicians, philosophers, legal theorists and policy makers. (Jellinek, 1960; Fingarette, 1988; Leshner, 1997; Schaler, 1999; Heyman, 2009).
It is generally assumed that if alcoholism is a disease, then alcoholics are less morally responsible for their actions directly connected with their drinking,
and if it is not a disease, then they are morally responsible.
However, as is clear from many studies having a mental disorder does not automatically imply that the person is not morally responsible for the associated behavior. Thus further argument on moral responsibility is required.
How one proves that a condition is a disease depends partly on what criteria of disease we can agree upon, but even without giving a definition of disease, one can see that the claim that the empirical evidence entails that alcoholism is a disease is highly contestable
The fact that a habit such as heavy drinking has a genetic component again does not prove that it is a disease. Laziness and cowardice could also turn out to have genetic components, but that would not make them diseases.
The problem for the disease status of alcoholism is that a habitual drinker can be described with such strongly evaluative terms as weak, self-deceiving, selfish, self-destructive, shortsighted, uncaring about other people, and even pathetic. Some would claim that such psychological characteristics provide the best explanation of an alcoholic's problem drinking, and if this is right, then the alcoholism-as-disease explanation is at best secondary, and at worst, utterly wrong-headed. While it is hard to find a description of self-destructive heavy drinking that makes it simply a matter of personal decision, an expression of one's values, or a rational choice, it does seems that problem drinking can often be a self-perpetuating way of life. It is difficult or impossible to locate a specific single cause of the drinking, and it also seems that the drinker has a role in perpetuating her problem. It is not simply something that happens to her i,e a disease.
Public policies tend not to recognize part or semi-diseases, and may look to extra-scientific or psychological considerations, such as the social and economic effects of labeling alcoholism a disease, to tip the classificatory scales one way or the other,i.e you have a disease get ye
to AA and attend 90 meetings in 90 days, says the Judge to the repeated drunk for causing another affray.
Indeed, addiction can provide an important test case for any theory of the nature of action, since it is a prime example of irrationality, and it is important that theories about the nature of practical reasoning be able to give an adequate account of the nature of irrationality
There has been a great deal of discussion of whether alcoholism should count as a disease, by physicians, philosophers, legal theorists and policy makers. (Jellinek, 1960; Fingarette, 1988; Leshner, 1997; Schaler, 1999; Heyman, 2009).
It is generally assumed that if alcoholism is a disease, then alcoholics are less morally responsible for their actions directly connected with their drinking,
and if it is not a disease, then they are morally responsible.
However, as is clear from many studies having a mental disorder does not automatically imply that the person is not morally responsible for the associated behavior. Thus further argument on moral responsibility is required.
How one proves that a condition is a disease depends partly on what criteria of disease we can agree upon, but even without giving a definition of disease, one can see that the claim that the empirical evidence entails that alcoholism is a disease is highly contestable
The fact that a habit such as heavy drinking has a genetic component again does not prove that it is a disease. Laziness and cowardice could also turn out to have genetic components, but that would not make them diseases.
The problem for the disease status of alcoholism is that a habitual drinker can be described with such strongly evaluative terms as weak, self-deceiving, selfish, self-destructive, shortsighted, uncaring about other people, and even pathetic. Some would claim that such psychological characteristics provide the best explanation of an alcoholic's problem drinking, and if this is right, then the alcoholism-as-disease explanation is at best secondary, and at worst, utterly wrong-headed. While it is hard to find a description of self-destructive heavy drinking that makes it simply a matter of personal decision, an expression of one's values, or a rational choice, it does seems that problem drinking can often be a self-perpetuating way of life. It is difficult or impossible to locate a specific single cause of the drinking, and it also seems that the drinker has a role in perpetuating her problem. It is not simply something that happens to her i,e a disease.
Public policies tend not to recognize part or semi-diseases, and may look to extra-scientific or psychological considerations, such as the social and economic effects of labeling alcoholism a disease, to tip the classificatory scales one way or the other,i.e you have a disease get ye
to AA and attend 90 meetings in 90 days, says the Judge to the repeated drunk for causing another affray.
Indeed, addiction can provide an important test case for any theory of the nature of action, since it is a prime example of irrationality, and it is important that theories about the nature of practical reasoning be able to give an adequate account of the nature of irrationality
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