The Despotic Character of Truth

The Despotic Character of Truth

Mr Krugman in your New York Times article you weaponise Orwell for your argument, so permit me to utilise Oscar Wilde, Nietzsche and Hanna Ardendt to broaden the debate. The 'Decay Of Lying' is an essay by Oscar Wilde in which there is a sturdy and cogent defence of fabulation (lying). If we turn to Nietzsche he submits 'Convictions,’ are more dangerous enemies of truth than lies.’ So this trio of Wilde, Nietzsche and Ardendt, argue for the paradoxical need to recognise 'untruth as a condition of life’. They point to the necessity of lying, or at least, the relativising of truthfulness. The most trenchant consideration of this issue is probably to be found in Hannah Arendts' celebrated essays of 1968 and 1971, ‘Truth and Politics’ and ‘Lying in Politics’. ‘The deliberate falsehood and the outright lie, used as legitimate means to achieve political ends,’ she soberly notes in the latter, ‘have been with us since the beginning of recorded history.' Truthfulness has never been counted among the political virtues, and lies have always been regarded as justifiable tools in political dealings. a more fundamental concern, which she calls the ‘despotic character of truth’ when it enters the political realm. For truth peremptorily claims to be acknowledged and precludes debate, and debate constitutes the very essence of political life. Talking of debate, I am afraid you article was akin to being fed on krill.