refining our empathetic imaginatio Why do humans have moral status while non-humans do not?

 Is there something distinctive about humanity that justifies the idea that humans have moral status while non-humans do not?

 answering this question will enable us to better understand the nature of human beings and the proper scope of our moral obligations. 

The task of arguing that humans have a unique and exclusive moral status is rather difficult.

Alice Crary argues that shifting perceptions of our moral landscapes occur because these landscapes, and more precisely the rich worlds of those who inhabit them, are not morally neutral.

Lori Gruen has argued for refining our empathetic imagination 

The characteristics that philosophers tend to look for in other animals to determine whether or not they are morally considerable, according to Crary, are already infused with moral importance, “human beings and other animals have empirically discoverable moral characteristics” (my emphasis, 2016: 85) that are, as she puts it “inside ethics”. These values often sneak in under a supposedly neutral gloss. 

By explicitly locating these characteristics inside ethics, the texture, quality, and purposes of our ethical reflection on moral considerability changes. Arriving at an adequate empirical understanding requires non-neutral methods, identifying historical and cultural perspectives as shaping how we consider other animals morally.

Some argue that shifting perceptions of our moral landscapes occur because these landscapes have blurred ever changing contours