Spend any time with young children and you will experience a master class in how humans concoct stories that help us make sense of the world.
As we construct causal narratives, we almost invariably adopt a default “intentional stance” (Dennett 1995).
We presume that everything operates intentionally, according to a mindful design. Children speak of rocks being flat so birds can land on them, or soil being soft so worms can dig in it.
Children are, as Kelemen (1999, 2003, 2004) describes them, “intuitive theists.” This disposition does not necessarily wane with age (Guggenmos 2012; Kelemen and Rosset 2009). It is also found among diverse cultures (Mills and Frowley 2012; Rottman et al. 2016). As Richard Dawkins observed (1995), we have “purpose on the brain.”
Mayr (1988) similarly suggested that people generally prefer vitalistic explanations to mechanistic ones. We easily impute intentions even to meteorological or celestial events, to geological features, and to cars, computers, copiers, phones, malfunctioning appliances, and other forms of mechanical technology.
The behavior may be so common that we seldom notice it until someone calls attention to it. Studies show that even when we consciously try to break the teleological paradigm, we inadvertently revert to it under conditions of mental stress (Kelemen and Rosset 2009). As educators, we need to consider whether teleological schema, the “function compunction,” may be hardwired in our brains.
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