indeterminacy that afflict much of our ordinary talk

 Forms of indeterminacy that afflict much of our ordinary talk about the world. For instance, it is no news that ordinary language expressions can be vague; our linguistic practices have not fixed their meaning with absolute precision. Our lexicon includes predicates such as ‘bald’, even though we have not settled on a clear criterion for classifying each person as either bald or not bald. We have names or singular terms such ‘Everest’ or ‘downtown Manhattan’, even though we lack a precise criterion for drawing a boundary around their referents

To make the analogy with semantic vagueness more explicit, I am saying that the truth conditions of ontological claims obey the principles of a super valuational semantics the corpus of those truths that are presupposed by our ontological credo is defined by assertions that are metaphysically “super-true”, i.e., true no matter how one specifies the metaphysical make-up of the entities referred to or quantified over by those assertions.