Are statues 'real; things?

 What matters is not the nature of numbers but the principles that govern number theory. Well, then, if that is how things work in mathematics, one might hold a parallel view with regard to other contexts as well. Surely many biologists feel that way in regard to the metaphysical disputes on the nature of species, for instance. And the same may be said of any metaphysical dispute vis-à-vis a common ontological stance, including disputes over the metaphysics of ordinary objects. ‘Surely statues are real things, but don’t ask me what they are because I wouldn’t know what to answer. I have never thought about that—and never will!’ What truly matters—one could say—are the principles and laws that govern our favorite theories, whose truth depends on the existence of the entities they refer to or quantify over. Then one is free to go further and specify the metaphysical make-up of such entities. But that is an optional task, not a prerequisite for their legitimate inclusion in our inventory of the universe.