The uncertainty, the unprovability, of religious propositions is, Kant believed, a good thing; for if religious propositions could be proved, there would be nothing to take responsibility for. To put it in present day language, the fanatic is unconsciously fleeing responsibility. I
Leap of faith—yes, but only after reflection.
James’s words. A fine, but deeply challenging, account of this third option can be found in Wittgenstein’s “Lectures on Religious Belief.”23 (Wittgenstein described himself as not a believer,
Here is what Wittgenstein says: These [religious] controversies look entirely different from normal controversies. Reasons look entirely different from normal reasons. They are, in a way, quite inconclusive. The point is that if there were evidence, this would in fact destroy the whole business.
the Epistles might accept they are not only not reasonable, but that it is folly but that they dont
claim to be 'reasonable',
Leap of faith—yes, but only after reflection.
James’s words. A fine, but deeply challenging, account of this third option can be found in Wittgenstein’s “Lectures on Religious Belief.”23 (Wittgenstein described himself as not a believer,
Here is what Wittgenstein says: These [religious] controversies look entirely different from normal controversies. Reasons look entirely different from normal reasons. They are, in a way, quite inconclusive. The point is that if there were evidence, this would in fact destroy the whole business.
the Epistles might accept they are not only not reasonable, but that it is folly but that they dont
claim to be 'reasonable',
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