Domain-level intuitions and nonviolated assumptions,.

There are two major levels of conceptual information in semantic memory. One is that of “kind-concepts,” notions like “table” and “tiger” and “tarmac” and “tree.” 

The other consists of “domainconcepts,” such as “intentional agent,” “man made object,” “living thing.” 

Most of the information associated with these broader concepts comes in the format, not of declared statements (e.g., “living things grow with age”) but of intuitive expectations and inferences. Without being aware of it, one expects living things to grow, intentional agents to have goals, and their behavior to be caused by those goals, the structure of artifacts to be explained by a function, and the latter by a designer’s intention.

Now supernatural concepts describe minimal violations of such expectations: a tree is said to listen to people’s conversations, a statue is said to bleed on particular occasions, a person is described as being in several places at once, another one as going through walls, and so on. Note that such concepts violate domain-level and not kind-level expectations. A talking ebony tree goes against expectations not because ebony trees in particular are usually silent but because all plants are assumed to be non intentional