“Moral Skepticism” names a diverse collection of views that deny or raise doubts about various roles of reason in morality. Different versions of moral skepticism deny or doubt moral knowledge, justified moral belief, moral truth, moral facts or properties, and reasons to be moral.
Despite this diversity among the views that get labeled “moral skepticism”, many people have very strong feelings about moral skepticism in general. One large group finds moral skepticism obvious, because they do not see how anyone could have real knowledge of the moral status of anything or how moral facts could fit into a physical world
Since general scepticism is an epistemological (view about the limits of knowledge or justified belief,) the most central version of moral skepticism is the one that raises doubts about moral knowledge or justified moral belief.
Since general scepticism is an epistemological (view about the limits of knowledge or justified belief,) the most central version of moral skepticism is the one that raises doubts about moral knowledge or justified moral belief.
Dogmatic scepticism about moral knowledge is the claim that nobody ever knows that any substantive moral belief is true (cf. Butchvarov 1989, 2).
Some moral septics add this related claim:
Dogmatic scepticism about justified moral belief is the claim that nobody is ever justified in holding any substantive moral belief.
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