Truth values as the “slingshot argument”, a term coined by Jon Barwise and John Perry (in Barwise and Perry 1981: 395), who stressed thus an extraordinary simplicity of the argument and the minimality of presuppositions involved. Stated generally, the pattern of the argument goes as follows (cf. Perry 1996). One starts with a certain sentence, and then moves, step by step, to a completely different sentence
Pursuing this kind of analysis, one is very quickly confronted with two intricate problems. First, how should one treat declarative sentences? Should one perhaps separate them into a specific linguistic category distinct from the ones of names and functions? And second, how—from a functional point of view—should one deal with predicate expressions such as ‘is a city’, ‘is tall’, ‘runs’, ‘is bigger than’, ‘loves’, etc., which are used to denote classes of objects, properties of objects etc
Pursuing this kind of analysis, one is very quickly confronted with two intricate problems. First, how should one treat declarative sentences? Should one perhaps separate them into a specific linguistic category distinct from the ones of names and functions? And second, how—from a functional point of view—should one deal with predicate expressions such as ‘is a city’, ‘is tall’, ‘runs’, ‘is bigger than’, ‘loves’, etc., which are used to denote classes of objects, properties of objects etc
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