The
present, as we know, has a lifetime; i.e., it endures for a length of time
which we call durational distance. It follows that, if the present exists now,
it must have existed earlier - which presents problems for the spontaneity of
the performer. It is noticeable that each mental state includes an awareness or
‘memory’ of the mental states which precede it. As a result, we experience
mental life as a coherent succession of mental states. An ‘objective’ present
is, by definition, not consciousness; since it is not consciousness, it
obviously cannot qualify as ‘the present.’ If the present is conscious
experience the ‘universal present’ becomes a superfluous concept: we cannot
accommodate its existence.
We
might conjecture that some sort of universal present exists in addition to the
many subjective presents which exist, (i.e., in addition to the many individual
minds that exist). However, there is nothing to suggest that any sort of objective
present exists. In the absence of such a present, events in one person’s
consciousness, i.e., events in one person’s mental life, cannot be coordinated
with events in another person’s consciousness.
The above is an Extract from Peter Cheevers' PhD
http://www.worldcat.org/title/subject-and-its-performance/oclc/500328126
http://www.worldcat.org/title/subject-and-its-performance/oclc/500328126
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