According to the deflationary theory of truth, to assert that a statement is
true is just to assert the statement itself.
For example, to say that ‘snow is white’ is true, or that it is true that snow is white, is equivalent to saying simply that snow is white, and this, according to the deflationary theory, is all that can be said significantly about the truth of ‘snow is white’.
There are many implications of a theory of this sort for philosophical debate about the nature of truth.
1) Philosophers often make suggestions like the following: truth consists in correspondence to the facts;
2) truth consists in coherence with a set of beliefs or propositions; truth is the ideal outcome of rational inquiry.
According to the deflationist, however, such suggestions are mistaken, and, moreover, they all share a common mistake. The common mistake is to assume that truth has a nature of the kind that philosophers might find out about and develop theories of.
For the deflationist, truth has no nature beyond what is captured in ordinary claims such as that ‘snow is white’ is true just in case snow is white.
Philosophers looking for the nature of truth are bound to be frustrated, the deflationist says, because they are looking for something that isn't there.
I
Peter P. Cheevers
Read Peter P. Cheevers short stores published by Ether Book:
For example, to say that ‘snow is white’ is true, or that it is true that snow is white, is equivalent to saying simply that snow is white, and this, according to the deflationary theory, is all that can be said significantly about the truth of ‘snow is white’.
There are many implications of a theory of this sort for philosophical debate about the nature of truth.
1) Philosophers often make suggestions like the following: truth consists in correspondence to the facts;
2) truth consists in coherence with a set of beliefs or propositions; truth is the ideal outcome of rational inquiry.
According to the deflationist, however, such suggestions are mistaken, and, moreover, they all share a common mistake. The common mistake is to assume that truth has a nature of the kind that philosophers might find out about and develop theories of.
For the deflationist, truth has no nature beyond what is captured in ordinary claims such as that ‘snow is white’ is true just in case snow is white.
Philosophers looking for the nature of truth are bound to be frustrated, the deflationist says, because they are looking for something that isn't there.
I
Peter P. Cheevers
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